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Introduction
Game theory provides a formal language for the representation of interactive situations, that is, situations where several "entities" -called players -take actions that affect each other. The nature of the players varies depending on the 2 Rational play context in which the game theoretic language is invoked: in evolutionary biology (see, for example, Smith (1982) ) players are non-thinking living organisms; 1 in computer science (see, for example, Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008) ) players are artificial agents; in behavioral game theory (see, for example, Camerer (2003) ) players are "ordinary" human beings, etc. Traditionally, however, game theory has focused on interaction among intelligent, sophisticated and rational individuals. For example, Aumann describes game theory as follows:
"Briefly put, game and economic theory are concerned with the interactive behavior of Homo rationalis -rational man. Homo rationalis is the species that always acts both purposefully and logically, has well-defined goals, is motivated solely by the desire to approach these goals as closely as possible, and has the calculating ability required to do so." (Aumann (1985), p. 35) This chapter is concerned with the traditional interpretation of game theory, in particular, with what is known as the epistemic foundation program, whose aim is to characterize, for any game, the behavior of rational and intelligent players who know the structure of the game and the preferences of their opponents and who recognize each other's rationality and reasoning abilities. The fundamental problem in this literature is to answer the following two questions: (1) under what circumstances can a player be said to be rational? and (2) what does 'mutual recognition' of rationality mean? While there seems to be agreement in the literature that 'mutual recognition' of rationality is to be interpreted as 'common belief' of rationality, the issue of what it means to say that a player is rational is not settled. Everybody agrees that the notion of rationality involves two ingredients: choice and beliefs. However, the precise nature of their relationship involves subtle issues which will be discussed below, with a focus on dynamic games. We shall restrict attention to situations of complete information, which are defined as situations where the game being played is common knowledge among the players. 2 There is a bewildering collection of claims in the literature concerning the implications of rationality in dynamic games with perfect information: Aumann (1995) proves that common knowledge of rationality implies the backward 1 Evolutionary game theory has been applied not only to the analysis of animal and insect behavior but also to studying the "most successful strategies" for tumor and cancer cells (see, for example, Gerstung et al. (2011) ). 2 On the other hand, in a situation of incomplete information at least one player lacks knowledge of some of the aspects of the game, such as the preferences of her opponents, or the actions available to them, or the possible outcomes, etc. induction solution, Ben-Porath (1997) and Stalnaker (1998) prove that common belief / certainty of rationality is not sufficient for backward induction, Samet (1996) proves that what is needed for backward induction is common hypothesis of rationality, Feinberg (2005) shows that common confidence of rationality logically contradicts the knowledge implied by the structure of the game, etc. The purpose of this chapter is not to review this literature 3 but to highlight some of the conceptual issues that have emerged.
In Section 2 we start with a brief exposition of one of the essential components of a definition of rationality, namely the concept of belief, and we review the notions of a model of a game and of rationality in the context of simultaneous games. We also discuss the role of counterfactuals in the analysis of simultaneous games. In the context of dynamic games there is a new issue that needs to be addressed, namely what it means to choose a strategy and what the proper interpretation of strategies is. This is addressed in Section 3 where we also discuss the subtle issues that arise when attempting to define rationality in dynamic games. 4 In Section 4 we turn to the topic of belief revision in dynamic games and explore the use of subjective counterfactuals in the analysis of dynamic games with perfect information. Section 5 concludes.
The formalism is introduced gradually throughout the chapter and only to the extent that is necessary to give precise content to the concepts discussed. For the reader's convenience a table in the Appendix summarizes the notations used and the corresponding interpretations.
The analysis is carried out entirely from a semantic perspective. 5
Belief, common belief and models of games
For simplicity, we shall restrict attention to a qualitative notion of belief, thus avoiding the additional layer of complexity associated with probabilistic or graded beliefs.
Definition 2.1. An interactive belief structure (or multi-agent Kripke structure) is a tuple N, Ω, {B i } i∈N where N is a finite set of players, Ω is a set of states and, for every player i ∈ N, B i is a binary relation on Ω representing doxastic accessibility: the interpretation of ωB i ω is that at state ω player i considers state ω possible. 3 Surveys of the literature on the epistemic foundations of game theory can be found in Battigalli and Bonanno (1999) , Brandenburger (2007) , Dekel and Gul (1997), Perea (2007; 2012) . 4 The notion of rationality in dynamic games is also discussed in Perea (2014) . 5 For a syntactic analysis see Bonanno (2008; forthcomingb), Clausing (2003; ), de Bruin (2010 ), van Benthem (2011 . See also Pacuit (2014).
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We denote by B i (ω) the set of states that are compatible with player i's beliefs at state ω, 6 that is,
We assume that each
). Seriality captures the notion of consistency of beliefs, while the last two properties correspond to the notions of positive and negative introspection of beliefs. 7 Subsets of Ω are called events. We shall use E and F as variables for events. Associated with the binary relation B i is a belief operator on events
Thus B i E is the event that player i believes E. 8 Figure 1 shows an interactive belief structure with two players, where each relation B i is represented by arrows: ω ∈ B i (ω) if and only if there is an arrow, for player i, from ω to ω . Thus, in Figure 1 , we have that
In terms of belief operators, in this structure we have that, for instance, B 1 {γ} = {β, γ}, that is, at both states β and γ Player 1 believes event {γ}, while B 2 {γ} = {γ}, so that Player 2 believes event {γ} only at state γ.
Let B * be the transitive closure of i∈N B i 9 and define the corresponding operator B * : 2 Ω → 2 Ω by
(3) B * is called the common belief operator and when ω ∈ B * E then at state ω every player believes E and every player believes that every player believes E, and so on, ad infinitum.
6 Thus B i can also be viewed as a function from Ω into 2 Ω (the power set of Ω). Such functions are called possibility correspondences (or information functions) in the game-theoretic literature. 7 For more details see the survey in Battigalli and Bonanno (1999) . 8 In modal logic belief operators are defined as syntactic operators on formulas. Given a (multiagent) Kripke structure, a model based on it is obtained by associating with every state an assignment of truth value to every atomic formula (equivalently, by associating with every atomic formula the set of states where the formula is true). Given an arbitrary formula φ, one then stipulates that, at a state ω, the formula B i φ (interpreted as 'agent i believes that φ') is true if and only if φ is true at every state ω ∈ B i (ω) (that is, B i (ω) is a subset of the truth set of φ). If event E is the truth set of formula φ then the event B i E is the truth set of the formula B i φ. 9 That is, ω ∈ B * (ω) if and only if there is a sequence ω 1 , ..., ω m in Ω and a sequence j 1 , ..., j m−1 in N such that (1) ω 1 = ω, (2) ω m = ω and (3) for all k = 1, ..., m − 1, ω k+1 ∈ B j k (ω k ). : in this case we have that, for example, B * {γ} = {γ} and thus B 1 B * {γ} = {β, γ}, that is, event {γ} is commonly believed only at state γ, but at state β Player 1 erroneously believes that it is common belief that {γ} is the case. 10 When the relations B i (i ∈ N) are also assumed to be reflexive (ω ∈ B i (ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω), then they become equivalence relations and thus each B i gives rise to a partition of Ω. In partitional models, beliefs are necessarily correct and one can speak of knowledge rather than belief. As Stalnaker (1996) points out, it is methodologically preferable to carry out the analysis in terms of (possibly erroneous) beliefs and then -if desired -add further conditions that are sufficient to turn beliefs into knowledge. The reason why one should not start with the assumption of necessarily correct beliefs (that is, reflexivity of the B i 's) is that this assumption has strong intersubjective implications: "The assumption that Alice believes (with probability one) that Bert 6 Rational play believes (with probability one) that the cat ate the canary tells us nothing about what Alice believes about the cat and the canary themselves. But if we assume instead that Alice knows that Bert knows that the cat ate the canary, it follows, not only that the cat in fact ate the canary, but that Alice knows it, and therefore believes it as well." (Stalnaker (1996), p. 153.) One can express locally (that is, at a state ω) the properties of knowledge by means of the double hypothesis that, at that state, at least one player has correct beliefs (for some i ∈ N, ω ∈ B i (ω)) and that there is common belief that nobody has erroneous beliefs (for all ω ∈ B * (ω) and for all i ∈ N, ω ∈ B i (ω )). 11 Adding such hypotheses introduces strong forms of agreements among the players (see Bonanno and Nehring (1998) ) and is, in general, not realistic.
Interactive belief structures can be used to model particular contexts in which a game is played. Let us take, as a starting point, strategic-form games (also called normal-form games), where players make their choices simultaneously (an example is a sealed-bid auction). 12 Definition 2.2. A strategic-form game with ordinal payoffs is a tuple N, {S i , i } i∈N where N is a set of players and, for every i ∈ N, S i is a set of choices or strategies available to player i and i is i's preference relation over the set of strategy profiles S = × i∈N S i . 13 11 This is a local version of knowledge (defined as true belief) which is compatible with the existence of other states where some or all players have erroneous beliefs (see Bonanno and Nehring (1998) , in particular Definition 2 on page 9 and the example of Figure 2 on page 6). Note that philosophical objections have been raised to defining knowledge as true belief; for a discussion of this issue see, for example, Stalnaker (2006) . 12 Strategic-form games can also be used to represent situations where players move sequentially, rather than simultaneously. This is because, as discussed later, strategies in such games are defined as complete, contingent plans of action. However, the choice of a strategy in a dynamic game is thought of as being made before the game begins and thus the strategic-form representation of a dynamic game can be viewed as a simultaneous game where all the players choose their strategies simultaneously before the game is played. 13 A preference relation over a set S is a binary relation on S which is complete or connected (for all s, s ∈ S, either s s or s s, or both) and transitive (for all s, s , s ∈ S, if s s and s s then s s ). We write s s as a short-hand for s s and s s and we write s ∼ s as a short-hand for s s and s s. The interpretation of s i s is that player i considers s to be at least as good as s , while s i s means that player i prefers s to s and s ∼ i s means that she is indifferent between s and s . The interpretation is that there is a set Z of possible outcomes over which every player has a preference relation. An outcome function o : S → Z associates an outcome with every strategy profile, so that the preference relation over Z induces a preference relation over S.
We shall throughout focus on ordinal preferences (rather than cardinal preferences with associated expected utility comparisons) 14 for two reasons: (1) since the game is usually hypothesized to be common knowledge among the players, it seems far more realistic to assume that each player knows the ordinal rankings of her opponents rather than their full attitude to risk (represented by a cardinal utility function) and (2) our aim is to point out some general conceptual issues, which are independent of the notion of expected utility.
The definition of a strategic-form game specifies the choices available to the players and what motivates those choices (their preferences over the possible outcomes); however, it leaves out an important factor in the determination of players' choices, namely what they believe about the other players. Adding a specification of the players' beliefs determines the context in which a particular game is played and this can be done with the help of an interactive belief structure.
is an interactive belief structure (see Definition 2.1) and, for every i ∈ N, σ i : Ω → S i is a function that assigns to each state ω a strategy σ i (ω) ∈ S i of player i.
Let σ(ω) = (σ i (ω)) i∈N denote the strategy profile associated with state ω. The function σ : Ω → S gives content to the players' beliefs. If ω ∈ Ω, x ∈ S i and σ i (ω) = x then the interpretation is that at state ω player i "chooses" strategy x. The exact meaning of 'choosing' is not elaborated further in the literature: does it mean that player i has actually played x, or that she is committed to playing x, or that x is the output of her deliberation process? Whatever the answer, the assumption commonly made in the literature is that player i has correct beliefs about her chosen strategy, that is, she chooses strategy x if and only if she believes that her chosen strategy is x. This can be expressed formally as follows. For every x ∈ S i , let [σ i = x] be the event that player i chooses strategy x, that is,
Then the assumption is that
We will return to this assumption later on, in our discussion of dynamic games. Figure 2 shows a strategic-form game in the form of a table, where the preference relation i of player i is represented numerically by an ordinal utility function u i : S → R, that is, a function satisfying the property that u i (s) ≥ u i (s ) 
How can rationality be captured in a model? Consider the following -rather weak -definition of rationality: player i is rational at stateω if -given that she chooses the strategyŝ i ∈ S i at stateω (that is, given that σ i (ω) =ŝ i ) -there is no other strategy s i ∈ S i which player i believes, at stateω, to be better (that is, to yield a higher payoff) thanŝ i . This can be stated formally as follows. First of all, for every state ω, denote by σ −i (ω) the strategy profile of the players other than i, that is, σ −i (ω) = (σ 1 (ω), ..., σ i−1 (ω), σ i+1 (ω), ..., σ n (ω)) (where n is the number of players). Then (recall that -since
G Bonanno
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For example, in the model of the strategic-form game of Figure 2 obtained by adding to the interactive belief structure of Figure 1 the strategy assignments given above in (5), we have that both players are rational at every state and thus there is common belief of rationality at every state. In particular, there is common belief of rationality at state β, even though the strategy profile actually chosen there is (t, r) (with payoffs (0, 0)) and each player would do strictly better with a different choice of strategy. Note also that, in this model, at every state it is common belief between the players that each player has correct beliefs, 15 although at state β neither player does in fact have correct beliefs.
It is well known that, in any model of any finite strategic-form game, a strategy profile s = (s i ) i∈N is compatible with common belief of rationality if and only if, for every player i, the strategy s i survives the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. 16 What is the conceptual content of the definition given in (7)? It is widely claimed that the notion of rationality involves the use of counterfactual reasoning. For example, Aumann writes: Yet the structures used so far do not incorporate the tools needed for counterfactual reasoning. The definition of rationality given in (7) involves comparing the payoff of a strategy different from the one actually chosen with the payoff of the chosen strategy. Can this counterfactual be made explicit?
First we review the standard semantics for counterfactuals. 17 10 Rational play Definition 2.4. Given a set of states Ω and a set E ⊆ 2 Ω \∅ of events, interpreted as admissible hypotheses, a counterfactual selection function is a function f : Ω × E → 2 Ω that satisfies the following properties: ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀E, F ∈ E,
The event f (ω, E) is interpreted as "the set of states closest to ω where E is true". Condition 1 says that there indeed exist states closest to ω where E is true (recall that if E ∈ E then E ∅). Condition 2 is a consistency condition that says that the states closest to ω where E is true are indeed states where E is true. Condition 3 says that if E is true at ω then there is only one state closest to ω where E is true, namely ω itself. Condition 4 says that if E implies F and some closest F-states to ω are in E, then the closest E-states to ω are precisely those states in E that are also the closest F-states to ω. 18 Given a hypothesis E ∈ E and an event F ⊆ Ω, a counterfactual statement of the form "if E were the case then F would be the case", which we denote by E ⇒ F, is considered to be true at state ω if and only if f (ω, E) ⊆ F, that is, if F is true in the closest states to ω where E is true. Thus, one can define the operator ⇒ : E × 2 Ω → 2 Ω as follows:
Adding a counterfactual selection function to an interactive belief structure allows one to consider complex statements of the form "if E were the case then player i would believe F" (corresponding to the event E ⇒ B i F), or "player i believes that if E were the case then F would be the case" (corresponding to B i (E ⇒ F)), or "Player 1 believes that if E were the case then Player 2 would believe F" (corresponding to B 1 (E ⇒ B 2 F)), etc. Now, returning to models of strategic-form games and the definition of rationality given in (7), the addition of a counterfactual selection function to a model allows one to compare player i's payoff at a stateω, where she has chosen strategyŝ i , with her payoff at the states closest toω where she chooses a strategy s i ŝ i . Implicit in (7) is the assumption that in those counterfactual states player i's beliefs about her opponents' choices are the same as inω. This is an assumption: it may be a sensible one to make (indeed Stalnaker Stalnaker (1998; 1999) argues that it would be conceptually wrong not to make this assumption) but nonetheless it may be worthwhile bringing it to light in a more complete analysis where counterfactuals are explicitly modeled. Within the context of strategic-form games, this is done in Board (2006) and Zambrano (2004) , where counterfactuals are invoked explicitly in the definition of rationality. 19
Models of dynamic games
In dynamic games (also called extensive-form games) players make choices sequentially, having some information about the moves previously made by their opponents. If information is partial, the game is said to have imperfect information, while the case of full information is referred to as perfect information. We shall focus on perfect-information games, which are defined as follows. If A is a set, we denote by A * the set of finite sequences in A. If h = a 1 , ..., a k ∈ A * and 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the sequence a 1 , ..., a j is called a prefix of h. If h = a 1 , ..., a k ∈ A * and a ∈ A, we denote the sequence a 1 , ..., a k , a ∈ A * by ha.
Definition 3.1. A finite dynamic game with perfect information and ordinal payoffs is a tuple A, H, N, ι, { i } i∈N whose elements are:
• A finite set of actions A.
• A finite set of histories H ⊆ A * which is closed under prefixes (that is, if h ∈ H and h ∈ A * is a prefix of h, then h ∈ H). The null history , denoted by ∅, is an element of H and is a prefix of every history. A history h ∈ H such that, for every a ∈ A, ha H, is called a terminal history. The set of terminal histories is denoted by Z. D = H\Z denotes the set of nonterminal or decision histories. For every decision history h ∈ D, we denote by A(h) the set of actions available at h, that is, Figure 3 : A perfect information game
• A function ι : D → N that assigns a player to each decision history. Thus ι(h) is the player who moves at history h. For every i ∈ N, let D i = ι −1 (i) be the set of histories assigned to player i.
• For every player i ∈ N, i is an ordinal ranking of the set Z of terminal histories.
The ordinal ranking of player i is normally represented by means of an ordinal utility (or payoff ) function U i : Z → R satisfying the property that
Histories will be denoted more succinctly by listing the corresponding actions, without angled brackets and without commas; thus instead of writing ∅, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 we simply write a 1 a 2 a 3 a 4 . An example of a perfect-information game is shown in Figure 3 in the form of a tree. Each node in the tree represents a history of prior moves and is labeled with the player whose turn it is to move. For example, at history a 2 c 2 Player 2 Player 1 Figure 4 : The strategic form corresponding to the game of Figure 3 it is Player 1's turn to move (after his initial choice of a 2 followed by Player 2's choice of c 2 ) and he has to choose between two actions: d 1 and d 2 . The terminal histories (the leaves of the tree, denoted by z j , j = 1, ..., 5) represent the possible outcomes and each player i is assumed to have a preference relation i over the set of terminal histories (in Figure 3 the players' preferences over the terminal histories have been omitted).
In their seminal book, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) showed that a dynamic game can be reduced to a normal-form (or strategic-form) game by defining strategies as complete, contingent plans of action. In the case of perfect-information games a strategy for a player is a function that associates with every decision history assigned to that player one of the choices available there. For example, a possible strategy of Player 1 in the game of Figure 3 is (a 1 , d 2 ). A profile of strategies (one for each player) determines a unique path from the null history (the root of the tree) to a terminal history (a leaf of the tree). Figure 4 shows the strategic-form corresponding to the extensive form of Figure 3 .
How should a model of a dynamic game be constructed? One approach in the literature (see, for example, Aumann (1995) ) has been to consider models of the corresponding strategic-form (the type of models considered in Section 2: see Definition 2.3). However, there are several conceptual issues that arise in this context. Recall that the interpretation of s i = σ i (ω) suggested in Section 2 is that at state ω player i "chooses" strategy s i . Now consider a model of the game of Figure 3 and a state ω where σ 1 (ω) = (a 1 , d 2 ). What does it mean to say that Player 1 "chooses" strategy (a 1 , d 2 )? The first part of the strategy, namely a 1 , can be interpreted as a description of Player 1's actual choice to play a 1 , but the second part of the strategy, namely d 2 , has no such interpretation: if Player 1 in fact plays a 1 then he knows that he will not have to make any further choices and thus it is not clear what it means for him to "choose" to play d 2 in a situation that is made impossible by his decision to play a 1 . 20 Thus it does not seem to make sense to interpret σ 1 (ω) = (a 1 , d 2 ) as 'at state ω Player 1 chooses (a 1 , d 2 )'. Perhaps the correct interpretation is in terms of a more complex sentence such as 'Player 1 chooses to play a 1 and if -contrary to thishe were to play a 2 and Player 2 were to follow with c 2 , then Player 1 would play d 2 '. Thus while in a simultaneous game the association of a strategy of player i to a state can be interpreted as a description of player i's actual behavior at that state, in the case of dynamic games this interpretation is no longer valid, since one would end up describing not only the actual behavior of player i but also his counterfactual behavior. (2012)), instead of using strategies, use the weaker notion of "plan of action" introduced by Rubinstein (1991) . A plan of action for a player only contains choices that are not ruled out by his earlier choices. For example, the possible plans of action for Player 1 in the game of Figure 3 are a 1 , (a 2 , d 1 ) and (a 2 , d 2 ). However, most of the issues raised below apply also to plans of action. The reason for this is that a choice of player i at a later decision history of his may be counterfactual at a state because of the choices of other players (which prevent that history from being reached). 21 This interpretation of strategies has in fact been put forward in the literature for the case of could object -from a methodological point of view -that it would be preferable to disentangle the two components and model them explicitly.
In order to clarify these issues it seems that, in the case of dynamic games, one should not adopt the models of Section 2 and instead consider a more general notion of model, where states are described in terms of players' actual behavior and any relevant counterfactual propositions are modeled explicitly.
We shall first consider models obtained by adding a counterfactual selection function (see Definition 2.4) to an interactive belief structure (see Definition 2.1) and show that such models are not adequate.
Fix a dynamic game Γ with perfect information and consider the following candidate for a definition of a model of Γ: it is a tuple N, Ω, {B i } i∈N , f, ζ where N, Ω, {B i } i∈N is an interactive belief structure, f : Ω×E → 2 Ω is a counterfactual selection function and ζ : Ω → Z is a function that associates with every state ω ∈ Ω a terminal history (recall that Z denotes the set of terminal histories in Γ). 22 Given a history h in the game, we denote by [h] the set of states where h is reached, that is, [h] = {ω ∈ Ω : h is a prefix of ζ(ω)}. We take the set of admissible hypotheses E (the domain of f (ω, ·)) to be the set of propositions of the form "history h is reached", that is, E = {[h] : h ∈ H} (where H is the set of histories in the game). We now discuss a number of issues that arise in such models.
In the models of Section 2 it was assumed that a player always knows his own strategy (see (4) above). Should a similar assumption be made within the context of dynamic games? That is, suppose that at state ω player i takes action a; should we assume that player i believes that she takes action a? For example, consider a model of the game of Figure 3 in which there are two states, ω and ω , such that B 2 (ω) = {ω, ω } and ζ(ω) = a 1 b 1 . Then at state ω Player 2 takes action b 1 . Should we require that Player 2 take action b 1 also at ω (since ω ∈ B 2 (ω))?
The answer is negative: the relation B 2 represents the prior or initial beliefs of Player 2 (that is, her beliefs before the game begins) and Player 2 may be uncertain as to whether Player 1 will play a 1 or a 2 and plan to play herself b 1 in the former case and c 1 in the latter case. Thus it makes perfect sense to have ζ(ω ) = a 2 c 1 . If we want to rule out uncertainty by a player about her action at a decision history of hers, then we need to impose the following restriction: mixed strategies (which we do not consider in this chapter, given our non-probabilistic approach): see, for example, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) and the references given there in Footnote 7. 22 Samet (1996) was the first to propose models of perfect-information games where states are described not in terms of strategies but in terms of terminal histories.
If h is a decision history of player i, a an action available to i at h and ha a prefix of ζ(ω) then, ∀ω ∈ B i (ω), if h is a prefix of ζ(ω ) then ha is a prefix of ζ(ω ).
The above definition can be stated more succinctly in terms of events. If E and F are two events, we denote by E → F the event ¬E ∪ F (we use the negation symbol ¬ to denote the set-theoretic complement, that is, ¬E is the complement of event E). Thus E → F captures the material conditional. Recall that, given a history h in the game, [h] = {ω ∈ Ω : h is a prefix of ζ(ω)}; recall also that D i denotes the set of decision histories of player i and A(h) the set of choices available at h. Then (10) can be stated as follows:
In words: if, at a state, player i takes action a at her decision history h, then she believes that if h is reached then she takes action a. 23 A more subtle issue is whether we should require (perhaps as a condition of rationality) that a player have correct beliefs about what she would do in a situation that she believes will not arise. Consider, for example, the (part of a) model of the game of Figure 3 illustrated in Figure 5 . The first line gives B 2 , the doxastic accessibility relation of Player 2, the second line the function ζ (which associates with every state a terminal history) and the third line is a partial illustration of the counterfactual selection function: the arrow from state β to state α labeled with the set {α, δ} represents f (β, {α, δ}) = {α} and the arrow from γ to δ labeled with the set {α, δ} represents f (γ, {α, δ}) = {δ}. 24 Note that the event that Player 1 plays a 2 is the set of states ω where a 2 is a prefix of ζ( . 26 That is, at state β it is actually the case that if Player 1 were to play a 2 then Player 2 would respond with c 2 , but Player 2 erroneously believes that (if Player 1 were to play a 2 ) she would respond with c 1 . As a condition of rationality, should one rule out situations like the one illustrated in Figure 5 ? Shouldn't a rational player have introspective access to what she would do in all the relevant hypothetical situations? In general, it seems that the answer should be negative, since what an individual would do in counterfactual situations may depend on external circumstances (e.g. states of the world or actions of other individuals) which the player might be unaware of (or have erroneous beliefs about). In such circumstances no amount of introspection can aid the individual in acquiring awareness of, or forming correct beliefs about, these external circumstances. This observation might not be applicable to games of complete information, but might be relevant in situations of incomplete information. 27 There are further issues to be examined. Consider, again, the perfect information game of Figure 3 and a model of this game in which there is a state, say α, where Player 1 plays a 2 . Is a 2 a rational choice for Player 1? Answering this question requires answering the following two questions:
Q1. What will Player 2 do next? Q2. What would Player 2 do if, instead, a 1 had been chosen?
Let us start with Q1. Consider a model (different from the one described in Figure 5 ) where at state α the play of the game is a 2 c 2 d 1 (that is, ζ(α) = a 2 c 2 d 1 ). If there is "common recognition" of rationality, Player 1 will ask himself how a rational Player 2 will respond to his initial choice of a 2 . In order to determine what is rational for Player 2 to do at state α, we need to examine Player 2's beliefs at α. Suppose that Player 2 mistakenly believes that Player 1 will play 25 Recall that, by Definition 2.4, since α ∈ 27 Recall that a game is said to have complete information if the game itself is common knowledge among the players. On the other hand, in a situation of incomplete information at least one player lacks knowledge of some of the aspects of the game, such as the preferences of her opponents, or the actions available to them, or the possible outcomes, etc. a 1 (α ∈ B 2 [a 1 ]); for example, B 2 (α) = {β} and β ∈ [a 1 ]. Furthermore, suppose that f (β, [a 2 ]) = {γ} and γ ∈ [a 2 c 2 d 2 ]. Then at α Player 2 believes that if it were the case that Player 1 played a 2 then the play of the game would be a 2 c 2 d 2 (α ∈ B 2 ([a 2 ] ⇒ [a 2 c 2 d 2 ])), in particular, she believes that Player 1 would play d 2 . Since, at state α, Player 1 in fact plays a 2 , Player 2 will be surprised: she will be informed that Player 1 played a 2 and that she herself has to choose between c 1 and c 2 . What choice she will make depends on her beliefs after she learns that (contrary to her initial expectation) Player 1 played a 2 , that is, on her revised beliefs. In general, no restrictions can be imposed on Player 2's revised beliefs after a surprise: for example, it seems perfectly plausible to allow Player 2 to become convinced that the play of the game will be a 2 c 2 d 1 ; in particular, that Player 1 will play d 1 . The models that we are considering do not provide us with the tools to express such a change of mind for Player 2: if one takes as her revised beliefs her initial beliefs about counterfactual statements that have a 2 as an antecedent, then -since α ∈ B 2 ([a 2 ] ⇒ [a 2 c 2 d 2 ]) -one is forced to rule out the possibility that after learning that Player 1 played a 2 Player 2 will believe that the play of the game will be a 2 c 2 d 1 . Stalnaker argues that imposing such restrictions is conceptually wrong, since it is based on confounding causal with epistemic counterfactuals:
"Player 2 has the following initial belief: Player 1 would choose d 2 on his second move [after his initial choice of a 2 ] if he had a second move. This is a causal 'if' -an 'if' used to express 2's opinion about 1's disposition to act in a situation that she believes will not arise. [...] But to ask what Player 2 would believe about Player 1 if she learned that she was wrong about 1's first choice is to ask a completely different question -this 'if' is epistemic; it concerns Player 2's belief revision policies, and not Player 1's disposition to act." (Stalnaker (1998), p. 48 ; with small changes to adapt the quote to the game of Figure 3 .)
Let us now turn to question Q2. Suppose that, as in the previous example, we are considering a model of the game of Figure 3 and a state α in that model where B 1 (α) ) Player 2 believes that the play of the game is a 1 b 1 , that is, that she herself will play b 1 .
δ is a state closest to ω where Player 1 plays a 1 , then (by the second property of counterfactual selection functions) at δ Player 2 will actually play b 2 . Since Player 1, by changing his choice, cannot cause the initial beliefs of Player 2 to change, Player 2 must have at δ the same beliefs that she has at ω, namely that she will play b 1 . Thus at state δ Player 2 believes that she will take action b 1 at her decision history a 1 while in fact she will take action b 2 , contradicting the requirement expressed in (11).
Thus we have shown that adding a counterfactual selection function to an interactive belief structure does not provide an adequate notion of model of a dynamic game. The approach followed in the literature 29 has been to do without an "objective" counterfactual selection function f and to introduce in its place "subjective" counterfactual functions f i (one for each player i ∈ N) representing the players' dispositions to revise their beliefs under various hypotheses. 30 This is the topic of the next section.
Belief revision
We will now consider models of dynamic games defined as tuples N, Ω, {B i } i∈N , {E i , f i } i∈N , ζ where -as before -N, Ω, {B i } i∈N is an interactive belief structure and ζ : Ω → Z is a function that associates with every state ω ∈ Ω a terminal history. The new element is {E i , f i } (for every player i ∈ N), which is a subjective counterfactual selection function, defined as follows.
Definition 4.1. For every i ∈ N, let E i ⊆ 2 Ω \∅ be a set of events representing potential items of information or admissible hypotheses for player i. 31 A subjective counterfactual selection function is a function f i : Ω × E i → 2 Ω that satisfies 29 See, for example, Arló-Costa and Bicchieri (2007), Baltag et al. (2009) , Battigalli et al. (2013) , Board (1998) , Bonanno (2011 ), Clausing (2004 , Halpern (1999a) , Samet (1996) . 30 In Clausing (2004) there is also an objective counterfactual selection function, but it is used only to encode the structure of the game in the syntax. 31 For example, in a perfect-information game one can take E i = {[h] : h ∈ D i }, that is, the set of propositions of the form "decision history h of player i is reached" or E i = {[h] : h ∈ H}, the set of propositions corresponding to all histories (in which case E i = E j for any two players i and j).
Possible interpretations of the event E ⇒ i F are "according to player i, if E were the case, then F would be true" (Halpern (1999a) ) or "if informed that E, player i would believe that F" (Stalnaker (1998)) or "under the supposition that E, player i would believe that F" (Arló-Costa and Bicchieri (2007)). 34 Thus the function f i can be used to model the full epistemic state of player i; in particular, how player i would revise her prior beliefs if she contemplated information that contradicted those beliefs. However, as pointed out by Stalnaker, "It should be noted that even with the addition of the belief revision structure to the epistemic models [...], they remain static models. A model of this kind represents only the agent's beliefs at a fixed time [before the game is played], together with the policies or dispositions to revise her beliefs that she has at that time. The model does not represent any actual revisions that are made when new information is actually received." (Stalnaker (2006), p. 198.) 35 Condition (11) rules out the possibility that a player may be uncertain about her own choice of action at decision histories of hers that are not ruled out by her initial beliefs. Does a corresponding restriction hold for revised beliefs? That is, suppose that at state ω player i erroneously believes that her decision history h will not be reached (ω ∈ [h] but ω ∈ B i ¬[h]); suppose also that a is the action that she will choose at h (ω ∈ [ha]). Is it necessarily the case that, according to her revised beliefs on the suppositions that h is reached, she believes that she takes action a? That is, is it the case that ω ∈ [h] ⇒ i [ha]? In general, the answer is negative. For example, consider a model of the game of Figure 3 in which there are states α, β and γ such that α ∈ [a 1 b 1 ], B 2 (α) = {β}, β ∈ [a 2 c 1 ], f 2 (α, [a 1 ]) = {γ} and γ ∈ [a 1 b 2 ]. Then we have that at state α Player 2 will in fact take action b 1 (after being surprised by Player 1's choice of a 1 ) and yet, according to her revised beliefs on the supposition that Player 1 plays a 1 , she does not believe 34 Equivalently, one can think of ⇒ i as a conditional belief operator B i (·|·) with the interpretation of B i (F|E) as 'player i believes F given information/supposition E' (see, for example, Board (2004) who uses the notation B E i (F) instead of B i (F|E)). 35 The author goes on to say that "The models can be enriched by adding a temporal dimension to represent the dynamics, but doing so requires that the knowledge and belief operators be time indexed..." For a model where the belief operators are indeed time indexed and represent the actual beliefs of the players when actually informed that it is their turn to move, see Bonanno (2013) .
Rational play
that she would take action b 1 (in fact she believes that she would take action b 2 ): α [a 1 ] ⇒ i [a 1 b 1 ]. In order to rule this out we need to impose the following strengthening of (11): 36
Should (15) be considered a necessary component of a definition of rationality? Perhaps so, if the revised beliefs were the actual beliefs of player i when she is actually informed (to her surprise) that her decision history h has been reached. In that case it may be reasonable to assume that -as the player makes up her mind about what to do -she forms correct beliefs about what she is going to do. However, we stressed above that the models we are considering are static models: they represent the initial beliefs and disposition to revise those beliefs at the beginning of the game. Given this interpretation of the revised beliefs as hypothetical beliefs conditional on various suppositions, it seems that violations of (15) might be perfectly rational. To illustrate this point, consider the above example with the following modification: f 2 (α, [a 1 ]) = {α, γ}. It is possible that if Player 1 plays a 1 , Player 2 is indifferent between playing b 1 or b 2 (she gets the same payoff). Thus she can coherently form the belief that if -contrary to what she expects -Player 1 were to play a 1 , then she might end up choosing either b 1 or b 2 : α ∈ [a 1 ] ⇒ i ([a 1 b 1 ] ∪ [a 1 b 2 ]). Of course, when actually faced with the choice between b 1 and b 2 she will have to break her indifference and pick one action (perhaps by tossing a coin): in the example under consideration (where α ∈ [a 1 b 1 ]) she will pick b 1 (perhaps because the outcome of the coin toss is Heads: something she will know then but cannot know at the beginning).
How can rationality of choice be captured in the models that we are considering? Various definitions of rationality have been suggested in the litera-
In fact, by Condition 3 of Definition 4.1 (since, by hypothesis, ture, most notably material rationality and substantive rationality (Aumann (1995; ). The former notion is weaker in that a player can be found to be irrational only at decision histories of hers that are actually reached. The latter notion, on the other hand, is more stringent since a player can be judged to be irrational at a decision history h of hers even if she knows that h will not be reached. We will focus on the weaker notion of material rationality. We want to define a player's rationality as a proposition, that is, an event. Let u i : Z → R be player i's ordinal utility function (representing her preferences over the set of terminal histories Z) and define π i : Ω → R by π i (ω) = u i (ζ(ω)). For every x ∈ R, let [π i ≤ x] be the event that player i's payoff is not greater than x, that is,
Then we say that player i is materially rational at a state if, for every decision history h of hers that is actually reached at that state and for every real number x, it is not the case that she believes -under the supposition that h is reachedthat (1) her payoff from her actual choice would not be greater than x and (2) her payoff would be greater than x if she were to take an action different from the one that she is actually taking (at that history in that state). 37 Formally this can be stated as follows (recall that D i denotes the set of decision histories of player i and A(h) the set of actions available at h):
Note that, in general, we cannot replace the antecedent [ha] 
, because at state ω player i might initially believe that h will not be reached, in which case it would be trivially true that ω ∈ B i ([ha] → [π i ≤ x]). Thus, in general, her rationality is judged on the basis of her revised beliefs on the supposition that h is reached. Note, however, that if ω ∈ ¬B i ¬[h], that is, if at ω she does not rule out the possibility that h will be reached and a ∈ A(h) is the action that she actually takes at ω (ω ∈ [ha]), then, for every event F, ω ∈ B i ([ha] → F) if and only if ω ∈ ([ha] ⇒ i F). 38 Note also that, according 37 This is a "local " definition in that it only considers, for every decision history of player i, a change in player i's choice at that decision history and not also at later decision histories of hers (if any). One could make the definition of rationality more stringent by simultaneously considering changes in the choices at a decision history and subsequent decision histories of the same player (if any). 38 Proof. Suppose that ω ∈ [ha] ∩ ¬B i ¬[h]. As shown in Footnote 36 (see (F2)),
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Rational play to (16), a player is trivially rational at any state at which she does not take any actions.
The solution concept which is normally used for perfect-information games is the backward-induction solution, which is obtained as follows. Start from a decision history followed only by terminal histories (such as history a 1 a 2 in the game of Figure 6 ) and pick an action there that is payoff-maximizing for the corresponding player; delete the selected decision history, turn it into a terminal history and associate with it the payoff vector corresponding to the selected choice; repeat the procedure until all the decision histories have been exhausted. For example, the backward-induction solution of the game of Figure 6 selects actions d 3 and d 1 for Player 1 and d 2 for Player 2, so that the corresponding outcome is d 1 .
Does initial common belief that all the players are materially rational (according to (16)) imply backward induction in perfect-information games? The answer is negative. 39 To see this, consider the perfect-information game shown in Figure 6 and the model of it shown in Figure 7 . 40 First of all, note that the common belief relation B * is obtained by adding to B 2 the pair (β, β); thus, in particular, B * (β) = {β, γ}. We want to show that both players are materially rational at both states β and γ, so that at state β it is common belief that both players are materially rational, despite that fact that the play of the game at β 39 In fact, common belief of material rationality does not even imply a Nash equilibrium outcome. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile satisfying the property that no player can increase her payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy. A Nash equilibrium outcome of a perfect-information game is a terminal history associated with a Nash equilibrium. A backward-induction solution of a perfect-information game can be written as a strategy profile and is always a Nash equilibrium. 40 In Figure 6 , for every terminal history, the top number associated with it is Player 1's utility and the bottom number is Player 2's utility. In Figure 7 we have only represented parts of the functions f 1 and f 2 , namely that f 1 (γ, {α, β, δ}) = {δ} and f 2 (β, {α, β, δ}) = f 2 (γ, {α, β, δ}) = {α} (note that [a 1 ] = {α, β, δ}). Similar examples can be found in Board (2004) , Clausing (2004) , Rabinowicz (2000) , Stalnaker (1998) . is a 1 a 2 d 3 , while the outcome associated with the backward-induction solution is d 1 (furthermore, there is no Nash equilibrium whose associated outcome is a 1 a 2 d 3 ). Clearly, Player 1 is materially rational at state β (since he obtains his largest possible payoff); he is also rational at state γ because he knows that he plays d 1 , obtaining a payoff of 1, and believes that if he were to play a 1 Player 2 would respond with d 2 and give him a payoff of zero: this belief is encoded in f 1 (γ, [a 1 ]) = {δ} (where [a 1 ] = {α, β, δ}) and ζ(δ) = a 1 d 2 . Player 2 is trivially materially rational at state γ since she does not take any actions there. Now consider state β. Player 2 initially erroneously believes that Player 1 will end the game by playing d 1 ; however, Player 1 is in fact playing a 1 and thus Player 2 will be surprised. Her initial disposition to revise her beliefs on the supposition that Player 1 plays a 1 is such that she would believe that she herself would play a 2 and Player 1 would follow with a 3 , thus giving her the largest possible payoff (this belief is encoded in f 2 (β, [a 1 ]) = {α} and ζ(α) = a 1 a 2 a 3 ). Hence she is rational at state β, according to (16) .
In order to obtain the backward-induction solution, one needs to go beyond common initial belief of material rationality. Proposals in the literature include the notions of epistemic independence (Stalnaker (1998) ), strong belief (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) ), stable belief (Baltag et al. (2009) ), substantive rationality (Aumann (1995) , Halpern (2001) ). For an overview of this literature the reader is referred to Brandenburger (2007) and Perea (2007) .
It is worth stressing that in the models considered above, strategies do not play any role: states are described in terms of the players' actual behavior along a play of the game. 41 One could view a player's strategy as her (conditional) beliefs about what she would do under the supposition that each of her decision histories is reached. However, the models considered so far do not guarantee that a player's revised beliefs select a unique action at each of her decision histories. For example, consider a model of the game of Figure 3 in which there are states α, β and γ such that α ∈ [a 2 c 1 ], B 2 (α) = {α}, β ∈ [a 1 b 1 ], γ ∈ [a 1 b 2 ] and f 2 (α, [a 1 ]) = {β, γ}. Then, at state α, Player 2 knows that she will take action c 1 and, according to her revised beliefs on the supposition that Player 1 plays a 1 , she is uncertain as to whether she would respond to a 1 by playing b 1 or b 2 (perhaps she is indifferent between b 1 and b 2 , because she would get the same payoff in either case). One could rule this possibility out by imposing the following restriction:
and ha is a prefix of ζ(ω ) and hb is a prefix of ζ(ω ) then a = b.
If (17) is imposed then one can associate with every state a unique strategy for every player. However, as Samet (1996) points out, in this setup strategies would be cognitive constructs rather than objective counterfactuals about what a player would actually do at each of her decision histories.
Conclusion
Roughly speaking, a player's choice is rational if, according to what the player believes, there is no other choice which is better for her. Thus, in order to be able to assess the rationality of a player, one needs to be able to represent both the player's choices and her beliefs. The notion of a model of a game does precisely this. We have discussed a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to represent not only the actual beliefs but also the counterfactual or hypothetical beliefs of the players. These issues highlight the complexity of defining the notion of rationality in dynamic games and of specifying an appropriate interpretation of the hypothesis that there is "common recognition" of rationality. A strategy of a player in a dynamic game with perfect information, according to the definition first proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) ), is a complete contingent plan specifying a choice of action for every decision history that belongs to that player. 42 We have argued that using the notion of strategy in models of dynamic games is problematic, since it implicitly introduces counterfactual considerations, both objective (in terms of statements about what a player would do in situations that do not arise) and subjective (in terms of the hypothetical or conditional beliefs of the players). Such counterfactuals ought to be modeled explicitly. We first considered the use of objective counterfactuals in models of dynamic games, but concluded that such counterfactuals are inadequate, since they express causal relationships, while it is epistemic counterfactuals that seem to be relevant in terms of evaluating the rationality of choices. We then considered models that make exclusive use of subjective (or epistemic) counterfactuals and showed that in these models strategies do not play any role and can thus be dispensed with.
The models of dynamic games considered above, however, are not the only possibility. Instead of modeling the epistemic states of the players in terms of their prior beliefs and prior dispositions to revise those beliefs in a static framework, one could model the actual beliefs that the players hold at the time at which they make their choices. In such a framework the players' initial belief revision policies (or dispositions to revise their initial beliefs) can be dispensed with: the analysis can be carried out entirely in terms of the actual beliefs at the time of choice. This alternative approach is put forward in Bonanno (2013) , where an epistemic characterization of backward induction is provided that does not rely on (objective or subjective) counterfactuals. 43,44 42 In general dynamic games, a strategy specifies a choice for every information set of the player. 43 Bonanno (2013) uses a dynamic framework where the set of "possible worlds" is given by state-instant pairs (ω, t). Each state ω specifies the entire play of the game (that is, a terminal history) and, for every instant t, (ω, t) specifies the history that is reached at that instant (in state ω). A player is said to be active at (ω, t) if the history reached in state ω at date t is a decision history of his. At every state-instant pair (ω, t) the beliefs of the active player provide an answer to the question "what will happen if I take action a?", for every available action a. A player is said to be rational at (ω, t) if either he is not active there or the action he ends up taking at state ω is optimal given his beliefs at (ω, t). Backward induction is characterized in terms of the following event: the first mover (at date 0) (i) is rational and has correct beliefs, (ii) believes that the active player at date 1 is rational and has correct beliefs, (iii) believes that the active player at date 1 believes that the active player at date 2 is rational and has correct beliefs, etc. 44 The focus of this chapter has been on the issue of modeling the notion of rationality and G Bonanno 31
A Summary of notation
The following table summarizes the notation used in this chapter.
"common recognition" of rationality in dynamic games with perfect information. Alternatively one can use the AGM theory of belief revision to provide foundations for refinements of Nash equilibrium in dynamic games. This is done in Bonanno (2011; forthcominga) where a notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium is proposed for general dynamic games (thus allowing for imperfect information). Perfect Bayesian equilibria constitute a refinement of subgame-perfect equilibria and are a superset of sequential equilibria. The notion of sequential equilibrium was introduced by Kreps and Wilson (1982) .
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Notation Interpretation Ω Set of states. E ⇒ i F = {ω ∈ Ω : f i (ω, E) ⊆ F} The event E ⇒ i F is interpreted as "the set of states where, according to player i, if E were the case, then F would be true".
